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This paper asks whether developing countries can reap credibility gains from submitting policy to
a strict monetary rule. Following earlier work, we look at the gold standard era (1880-1914) as a "natural
experiment" to test whether adoption of a rule-based monetary framework such as the gold standard
increased policy credibility. On the basis of the largest possible dataset covering almost sixty independent
and colonial borrowers in the London market, we challenge the traditional view that gold standard
adherence worked as a credible commitment mechanism that was rewarded by financial markets with
lower borrowing costs. We demonstrate that in the poor periphery -- where policy credibility is a particularly
acute problem -- the market looked behind "the thin film of gold". Our results point to a dichotomy:
whereas country risk premia fell after gold adoption in developed countries, there were no credibility
gains in the volatile economic and political environments of developing countries. History shows that
monetary policy rules are no short-cut to credibility in situations where vulnerability to economic and
political shocks, not time-inconsistency, are overarching concerns for investors.
Niall Ferguson
Harvard University











Monetary policy can be used to achieve short-term objectives such as boosting economic 
activity, lowering unemployment or financing budget deficits. If the market anticipates policy 
makers’ temptation to resort to surprise actions and doubts the commitment to sound policies, it 
will rationally demand to be compensated for this risk. In an environment of low policy 
credibility, interest rates will be higher than they ought to be. This is a short version of the well-
known time-inconsistency theorem of monetary policy first pointed out by Kydland and Prescott 
(1977) and elaborated by Barro and Gordon (1983). On the other hand, if policy credibility is 
high, the expectations of the public remain well anchored even in the face of adverse conditions 
as markets will not expect policy makers to put medium-run macroeconomic stability at risk. 
Achieving and maintaining policy credibility is hence a crucial task for monetary policy-makers 
around the world.  
While the advantages of credibility are evident, it is much less clear how credibility can 
be built in developing countries whose economies are often subject to shocks and have little 
reputational track record to build credibility on. A theoretically appealing solution in such cases 
is to pre-commit policy to a binding rule. Such a policy rule would tie the hands of politicians 
who might otherwise be prone to use monetary policy for short-run gains in output or to run 
excessive fiscal deficits. In this line of thought, the adoption of a currency board or a comparable 
rule-based framework would reduce the risks faced by investors, encouraging them to lend more 
at lower rates. In particular, policy makers in the developing world could enhance credibility in 
the eyes of international markets by importing stability from abroad (Velasco, 2000). In the past 
decade developing countries have often been advised to opt for a ‘hard peg’ or a free float to 
avoid the credibility pitfalls of intermediate currency regimes (Calvo and Mishkin, 2003). 
Bordo and Kydland were the first to argue that in the first era of financial globalization, 
between 1880 and 1914, the gold standard worked as a binding policy rule (Bordo and Kydland, 
1995) – subject to certain contingent escape clauses. The testable hypothesis derived from this  2 
new interpretation of the gold standard was that countries that had adopted the gold standard 
should, ceteris paribus, have been charged lower interest rates in the international capital market. 
A well-known empirical study confirmed this proposition (Bordo and Rockoff, 1996). The key 
finding was that the market considered adherence to the gold standard as a sign of financial 
rectitude – a credible commitment to “good [financial] housekeeping” – and charged lower risk 
premia on the foreign loans of gold standard countries than on the loans of countries not on gold. 
Lower risk premia in turn went hand in hand with massive capital flows from the center to the 
periphery (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004; Schularick; 2006). Another recent study by Obstfeld and 
Taylor summarises this view of the gold standard as a successful policy rule:  
Gold was apparently a good enough seal of approval by itself, and risk was priced 
without much reference to public debt levels, the terms of trade, or whether the country 
was part of the British Empire. (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003b, p. 260) 
However, until now the empirical defense of rule-based solutions to credibility problems 
comes mainly from economic history. Contemporary tests of the credibility effects of hard pegs 
have brought mixed results. While Carlson and Valev (2001) underline the positive effects in the 
case of Bulgaria, other authors have pointed out that the effects vary according to political and 
economic conditions (Guidotti and Vegh, 1999; Mulino, 2002; de la Torre et al., 2003; Blomberg 
et al., 2005).  
In this paper, we shall test the hypothesis that the gold standard era demonstrates the 
beneficial effects of rule-bound monetary policy, using a new and comprehensive data set. Our 
particular emphasis will be on developing countries, where credibility problems tend to be most 
acute and where policy advice is most problematic. The present paper hence relates closely to 
two strands of the recent literature in international economics. First, we aim to contribute to the 
debate on the credibility of hard currency pegs in developing countries (Carlson and Valev, 
2001, Feuerstein and Grimm, 2006; Blomberg et al., 2005). Second, we also reconsider the role 
of the gold standard and other factors as the drivers of financial globalization and massive capital  3 
flows from rich to poor economies before 1914 (Ferguson, 2004; Flandreau and Zumer, 2004; 
Clemens and Williamson, 2004; Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2005; Ferguson and Schularick, 
2006). Our key question is: Did the gold standard indeed work as a monetary policy rule with 
significant positive effects on policy credibility in the periphery? 
We follow previous studies by looking for credibility effects in country risk premia in the 
international market before and after adoption of the gold standard.
1 We regress country risk 
premia on a series of economic and political indicators for creditworthiness and look to a gold 
standard variable to determine whether gold adoption had statistically significant effects on the 
risk perception of international investors. The paper makes a number of new contributions to the 
debate.  
First, we have assembled the most comprehensive database to date covering almost the 
entire universe of developing country borrowing in the London capital market before 1914. Our 
sample is about three times larger than those of previous studies. The dataset, which was 
assembled by hand from contemporary publications, covers interest rates and economic control 
variables for close to sixty borrowers in the London capital market between 1880 and 1913. In 
contrast to previous datasets that focused on the narrower Atlantic economy, ours allows us to 
pay special attention to the experience of developing countries (as defined by their relative state 
of economic development). Second, we reconsider, integrate and move beyond the methodology 
of previous studies. We are able to reproduce some earlier results, but also cover two neglected 
issues. We single out countries that moved from a paper standard to gold, as opposed to 
“switching” from silver (or bimetallism) to gold. We also ask if the market rewarded gold 
adherence not immediately, but only after a period of successful adhesion. Third, while ensuring 
comparability of our econometric approach with previous studies, we propose to move beyond 
                                                 
1 An analysis of the interest rate spread between foreign and local currency bonds can be found in Mitchener and 
Weidenmier (2007).  Their (preliminary) results suggest that local and foreign rates did not converge after gold 
adoption, hence currency risk remained prominent. However, the assumption of identical default risk on local and 
international debt is debatable.   4 
standard static panel models and estimate a dynamic system generalized methods of moment 
(GMM) model, which allows us to model risk-perception as a Bayesian updating of country risk 
while taking account of potential endogeneity of some regressors.
2  
Our investigation proceeds in four steps. The first section reviews the original hypothesis 
that adherence to the gold standard worked as a credible commitment mechanism and describes 
the criticisms it has encountered. Section 2 presents our dataset and introduces the estimation 
strategy. Section 3 contains the empirical heart of this paper. We first reproduce the findings of 
some previous studies, before moving on to new estimations for our complete sample and for 
various sub-samples of developed and developing countries. Our findings here suggest that the 
market’s assessment of gold standard adherence as a “good housekeeping seal of approval” 
varied between country groups. Most importantly, there is no evidence that the gold standard 
offered a short-cut to policy credibility for the poor periphery. While we confirm a modest gold 
effect in the core economies, in developing countries the market looked behind “the thin film of 
gold”.
3 Section 4 asks why gold standard membership did not work as credible commitment 
mechanism in the periphery. We argue that in view of the economic and political instability of 
poor economies the market anticipated that the rule was not likely to be sustained in view of 
adverse economic and political circumstances. Section 5 concludes that earlier doubts on the 
credibility effect of the hard currency peg expressed, inter alia, by Eichengreen and Hausmann 
(1999), Ferguson (2003b), and Flandreau and Zumer (2004) were partly justified. The 
explanation for the low risk premia charged to developing borrowers in the sovereign bond 
market before World War One must go beyond monetary commitments to include not just 
economic fundamentals but also the political determinants of creditworthiness. 
                                                 
2 An exception here are Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) who estimated a model using the Arellano-Bond difference 
estimator, whereas we propose the newer system estimator by Arellano and Bover (1995) who alleviates some of the 
shortcomings with regard to instrument validity using the difference estimator.   
3  The phrase is J. H. Clapham’s, quoted in Sayers, Bank of England, vol. I, p. 9. Clapham was referring to the small 
size of the Bank of England’s gold reserve, but the phrase is suggestive of a wider point, namely that the gold 
standard’s credibility depended on much more than formal commitments by monetary authorities.   5 
 
 
I. The “good housekeeping” hypothesis and its critics 
 
The degree of financial integration reached before 1914 was truly impressive. In the decades 
before World War I, Britain exported on average between four and five percent of her gross 
national product abroad, while capital-importing economies could run current account deficits of 
even higher magnitudes for many years, even decades. Foreign investments in relation to gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 1913 stood at about 200 percent in Argentina, Chile and South 
Africa, and at or above 100 percent in countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, and Malaysia – 
about twice as high as the corresponding figures today (Twomey, 2000). About 40 percent of the 
total volume of British capital flows between 1880 and 1913 went to countries other than the 
comparatively rich settler economies. Today, by contrast, only 10–15 percent of global capital 
market flows reach countries classified as less developed by the World Bank (Schularick, 2006). 
It seems likely that the spread of globalization and the deepening of capital markets in 
this period was, in other words, at least partly due to perception of low country risks by 
European financial investors.
4 Following the pioneering study by Bordo and Rockoff in 1996, 
students of the pre-World War I global financial market have argued that the credibility (and 
hence risk-reducing) effects of hard-currency pegs were part of the success story. After 
controlling for other determinants of the risk perception of investors, Bordo and his collaborators 
found that being on gold conferred a significant credibility bonus. Based on the experience of 
nine non-Western European countries and colonies, Bordo and Rockoff showed that “all other 
                                                 
4 A more general “push-side” argument stresses the positive effects of the international gold standard on capital 
market integration. By decreasing exchange rate volatility in the core, the gold standard reduced uncertainty and 
transaction costs and led to deeper financial markets, see Bordo and Rockoff (1996) and Ferguson (2003b). The gold 
standard also reduced inflation expectations and thus led to very low nominal long-term interest rate levels in the 
core. The focus here is on the gold standard as a commitment mechanism in the recipient countries, hence as a 
“pull” factor.  6 
things equal, the rate on a gold bond would be 40 basis points lower if the country were on the 
gold standard” (Bordo and Rockoff, 1996, p. 413). The market’s preference for the gold standard 
thus provided an incentive to join the gold standard and stick to it, thereby contributing to the 
dynamic extension of the gold standard (Meissner, 2003).  
Another recent test of the Bordo-Rockoff hypothesis has been carried out by Maurice 
Obstfeld and Alan Taylor (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003b). With yield data for 21 borrowers, their 
findings rely on a larger sample than that of Bordo and Rockoff. In their empirical analysis of 
yield spreads they find gold standard adherence to have cut spreads by up to 30 basis points 
before the war. Moreover, Obstfeld and Taylor find that the credibility effect of gold adherence 
was strong enough to overrule even the most important solvency indicator – the relative burden 
of public debt:  
In the sovereign bond market before 1914, the gold standard did indeed confer a “seal of 
approval”, whereas two key macro fundamentals, the public debt and the terms of trade, 
seem to have mattered little, if at all.(Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003b, p.275) 
Other authors, however, have arrived at different conclusions. Using a dataset of 17 
mostly European countries, Marc Flandreau and Frédéric Zumer “rejected the conventional view 
that the exchange rate regime (participation to the gold standard) mattered in facilitating the 
global circulation of capital in the late 19
th century.” (Flandreau and Zumer, 2004, p.56) Their 
gold dummy was either statistically insignificant or had the “wrong” sign, suggesting that the 
enlargement of the gold club played little, if any, part in the interest rate convergence of the pre-
1914 period.
5 But what mattered to investors if not gold? According to Flandreau and Zumer, the 
answer is a combination of fiscal policy and economic “fundamentals” – to be precise, public 
debt service as a ratio of tax revenues, economic growth and inflation (in sum, the real debt 
                                                 
5 However, Flandreau and Zumer include a variable for exchange rate volatility. It is not implausible to assume that 
this variable was highly correlated to the gold standard variable.  7 
burden).
6 In their study on the impact of colonial affiliation on risk perception, Ferguson and 
Schularick (2006) also found no significant risk reduction attributable to gold standard 
adherence. Mitchener and Weidenmier (2007), too, found little evidence that gold standard 
adherence lowered the currency risk implied by differences between interest rates on local and 
foreign currency denominated debt.  
  How can we account for such divergent empirical interpretations? Three possibilities 
come to mind. An important part of the problem could simply be the gold “coding” issue; quite 
apart from methodological differences, there are simple disagreements about when a particular 
country was actually “on gold”. For example, it is far from clear even in the cases of well-
researched economies such as Austria and Italy, both of which “shadowed” the gold standard 
without having fully convertible currencies. It is even harder to be sure for smaller economies for 
which there is less readily accessible evidence about convertibility clauses and exchange rates. 
There is therefore a subjective element to retrospective identifications of “on gold” and “off 
gold” countries, especially when these are inferred ex post from exchange rates.  
The empirical specification could also be at the roots of disagreements. In the absence of 
a well-specified model including an appropriate set of control variables, the gold standard 
dummy may simply be a proxy for other omitted variables. The Japanese gold adoption in 1897 
provides an illustration of this problem.
7 Conventional current-yield data show a reduction of 
more than 200 basis points between 1896 and 1897. As other fundamentals such as public debt, 
the budget deficit or the level of development remained by and large the same, a regression will 
give the full credit of that reduction to the gold standard variable. However, the year of the 
adoption of the gold standard was also the culmination of a long process of political and 
economic reform in the Meiji era, the success of which was demonstrated by Japan’s military 
                                                 
6 This interpretation is not wholly incompatible with the one put forward by Bordo and Rockoff. If gold standard 
adherence worked as an incentive mechanism for sound policy, it may also have contributed to improvements in 
fundamentals. However, doubts about the disciplining effect on policy are expressed in Mosley (2003). 
7 For a detailed discussion see Sussman and Yafeh (2001) and Flandreau and Zumer (2004, p. 24).   8 
victory over China in 1895. The same year saw a successful debt conversion. Arguably, these 
factors could have mattered more than the switch to gold convertibility in driving down Japanese 
yields.
8  
Previous studies have included quite different sets of control variables. Some authors 
have opted for a “historical” approach relying only on data available to contemporaries 
(Ferguson, 2001; Flandreau and Zumer, 2004). Others have preferred a “modern” approach 
incorporating later data reconstructions such as GDP and ratios of public debt to GDP. The 
underlying methodological question is whether market risk perception should best be modeled 
inductively on the basis of indicators that were available to contemporaries, or deductively 
according to the predictions of today’s economic models – on an “as if” basis, so to speak – at 
the risk of anachronism.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the question of sampling. Previous studies 
relied on data for a relatively small number of countries – nine in the case of Bordo and Rockoff, 
17 for Obstfeld and Taylor, 21 for Flandreau and Zumer) – whereas more than sixty independent 
states, dominions and colonies had hard-currency government bonds listed at the London Stock 
Exchange between 1880 and 1914. At the same time, the samples in previous studies were 
geographically diverse, being either predominantly “Atlantic” (Bordo and Rockoff) or skewed 
towards the European periphery (Flandreau and Zumer). The inclusion of colonies alongside 
independent countries is another important issue. It is, for example, not obvious why gold 
standard adoption should be assumed to have had the same impact on a British colony – where it 
                                                 
8 A common problem underlying all previous (and our own) is that of regime selection. The decision to introduce a 
monetary regime like the gold standard may have been endogenously determined, that is, dependent on certain 
fundamentals that needed to be in place before a country could adopt the gold standard. The impact of gold adoption 
should thus be interpreted cautiously. It is not independent of other factors, “but merely a partially unconditional 
average benefit accruing to countries in a position to adopt the gold standard.” (Obstfeld and Taylor, (2003b). Yet in 
many respects the question whether a tangible economic benefit from gold adoption could be derived for the 
relatively large pool of countries whose economies fulfilled the basic prerequisites for gold standard adoption 
remains interesting in its own right. In practice, a rule bound monetary regime is often implemented under dire 
circumstances, so that the problem of regime selection could be less prevalent.   9 
often came as by-product of a de facto currency union with the United Kingdom – as on an 
independent Latin American state.  
  
 
II. Data and estimation strategy 
 
To solve these empirical puzzles, it is necessary to have an encompassing dataset with a broad 
range of control variables, including those of previous studies. With spreads of gold- or sterling-
denominated sovereign bonds for 34 independent countries and 23 British colonies at annual 
frequency as well as almost all the economic controls used in previous studies, our dataset is the 
most comprehensive that has yet been constructed.
9 The yield data for the period 1880–1913 
were collected by hand from The Investor’s Monthly Manual and The London Stock Exchange 
Weekly Intelligence, and refer to long-term (typically over ten years) bonds that were actively 
traded in the secondary market and had quotations for at least three years in a row.
10 The bulk of 
the historical economic control variables was also collected by hand from contemporary 
publications such as The Statesman’s Yearbook, Fenn’s Compendium, and the Annual Reports of 
the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders.
11 We used some data from modern statistical 
compilations (such as Mitchell’s volumes), but only when those were also available to 
nineteenth-century investors. However, since we also wanted to test whether the incompatible 
findings of previous studies were due to the choice of “historical” vs. “modern” indicators, our 
                                                 
9 The absence of gold or sterling-denominated bonds for France, Germany, Holland and Switzerland forced us to 
eliminate these four countries in order to avoid the inclusion of currency risk premia. In all, fewer than ten countries 
that were left out because of absent control variables. These included small Caribbean borrowers and a few colonial 
issuers such as Barbados and Trinidad. The group of British colonies includes the individual Australian and South 
African provinces before unionisation. 
10 In line with previous studies, we excluded all observations with spreads of more than 1000 basis points, since all 
these referred to bonds that were in default for many years, full repayment of which was considered unlikely. 
11 We also rely on material collected and kindly shared by other authors, in particular on the datasets of Obstfeld and 
Taylor (2003b) and Clemens and Williamson (2004). For a detailed discussion of contemporary country risk 
indicators see Flandreau and Zumer (2004). See also Ferguson and Schularick (2006).  10 
database also includes modern GDP estimates and related ratios.
12 Despite this effort, data are 
not available in all years in our panel. Nevertheless, we have nearly three times as many 
observations and countries as the widest-ranging previous study.  
  Table I summarizes our dataset. What can be seen at a glance is that the choice of the 
economic control variables has a strong impact on the number of observations and on the number 
of countries in the sample. The main reason is that GDP reconstructions are only available for a 
limited number of countries. 
 
[Table I here] 
                                                 





Other than quantitative economic control data, we constructed a number of dichotomous 
dummy variables. As is conventional, we included a dummy variable for countries that were not 
honoring their repayment obligations, in other words defaulters. To ensure consistency, the 
information was taken solely from the Annual Reports of the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders, which contain detailed information on countries that did not pay the amounts due 
Table I: dataset 
Variable N  Countries Average  St.  dev.  Minimum  Maximum
Country risk premium  1449  57  236.84  280.20  7.92  1934.47 
                    
"historical"                   
Public debt/revenues  1386  57  4.95  3.46  0.05  23.70 
Public debt/exports  1328  57  3.99  4.64  0.00  38.74 
Debt service/revenues  820  57  0.23  0.14  0.01  0.74 
Budget deficit/revenues  1384  57  0.12  0.36  -0.59  9.60 
Trade balance/exports  1388  57  -0.24  2.37  -8.54  0.79 
Exports/population 1388  57  4.73  7.36  0.05  66.64 
                    
"modern"                   
GDP per capita (USD 1990)  860  30  1770  1156  299  5581 
Debt/GDP 561  20  0.72  0.62  0.03  4.26 
Exports/GDP 561  20  0.20  0.17  0.03  0.93 
Budget deficit/GDP  548  20  -0.01  0.03  -0.13  0.18 
Primary exports/total exports  838  28  0.89  0.14  0.35  1.00 
Terms of trade (%-change)  838  28  -0.08  10.62  -59.75  71.60 
Tariff level (percent)  838  28  18.11  11.84  2.50  58.17 
Sources: see data appendix.                    12 
to bondholders.
13 Since one could expect that the market punished previous defaulters, a 
“memory” variable was given the value of one for ten years after a default occurred (following 
Flandreau and Zumer, 2004). Two political variables capture the potential effects of international 
war and civil unrest on market risk perception.  
There are two different approaches when it comes to coding dummies for gold standard 
adherence: de iure and de facto membership. In the first instance, we regarded countries as being 
“on gold” only if convertibility was formally legislated as well as maintained in practice. But we 
also tested the sensitivity of our results to two alternative codings. First, following Flandreau and 
Zumer, we also counted the de facto adherents as being “on gold”. Second, we double-checked 
the sensitivity of our results with the gold matrix from Meissner (2005), which gives slightly 
different dates for gold adoption.   
A significant challenge concerned the appropriate way to control for asset market shifts 
that might affect spreads over time. Two options are at hand: first, simple time-dummies that 
capture such movements in global risk appetite over time that are not accounted for by the 
variation in country fundamentals; second, a specification inspired by the international capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM), namely the correlation of individual assets with the market-wide 
risk (with country-specific slopes or “betas”). With the latter approach, there is again a problem 
of anachronistic modeling. The CAPM had not been invented at the time. In addition, the 
empirical support for CAPM remains rather weak (Fama and French, 1992). On the other hand, 
one can argue that there is no reason to believe that nineteenth-century investors were indifferent 
to the systematic risk of their investments. In the interest of comparability with recent studies, we 
report our regressions in the CAPM specification.
14 For this purpose, we constructed a global 
                                                 
13 Unlike Obstfeld and Taylor (2003b) we do not distinguish between partial and full defaulters, since we saw no 
objective method to classify systematically the individual cases. We reckon that the bond market would react to any 
payment problem. 
14 However, simple time-dummies lead to almost identical results. The distinction is more problematic with regard 
to colonies which had very “low betas”, see Ferguson and Schularick (2006).  13 
spread as the debt-weighted average of country spreads over the risk-free British benchmark 
bond known as the “consol”.
15 
  Finally, we moved beyond previous analyses in two ways. First, we focused specifically 
on countries that went on the gold from a previous paper standard. Following the time-
inconsistency literature, one could expect a larger credibility gain arising from a switch from 
paper to gold than from silver to gold. Second, we introduced a “probation variable” in order to 
see if the market rewarded gold adherence only in the case of faithful compliance over time. We 
experimented both with three- and five-year periods, but obtained similar results and therefore 
present only the results for the five-year probation period.  
   In our econometric approach, our overarching goal was to ensure comparability with 
previous studies. To control for heterogeneity in our panel, we opted for a standard fixed effects 
model, where individual country dummies capture the effects of time-invariant but unmeasured 
economic characteristics such as geography or culture. Like previous authors, we found evidence 
of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in our large panel, which makes ordinary least 
squares (OLS) problematic. Both feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) and panel-corrected 
standard errors (PCSE) are alternatives. In both variants, serial correlation can be accounted for 
via a country-specific AR(1) term.
16 Both estimators generally yield similar results, but we chose 
to present the potentially more robust PCSE estimates, as the number of groups is large relative 
to the number of years in our full sample (58/33). In such cases, FGLS produces overconfident 
test statistics (Beck and Katz, 1995a,b).
17 However, the key findings of this paper are 
                                                 
15 We also experimented with an unweighted average without finding any significant differences to the results stated 
below. The same is true for a GDP-weighted world return, which comes at the cost of a smaller sample.  
16 We also tried a common AR(1) for all panels, but obtained similar results.    
17 Obstfeld and Taylor (2003b) as well as Flandreau and Zumer (2004) employed a fixed-effects FGLS model, while 
Bordo and Rockoff (1996) chose a SUR (seemingly unrelated regression) approach. A possible caveat is that FGLS 
needs two crucial data transformations in order to produce an estimate of the unknown variance-covariance matrix 
of the disturbances. It is certainly superior in “asymptopia”, but was found to perform poorly when applied to finite 
real world samples, especially if the number of countries grew large relative to the time-periods (Beck and Katz, 
1995a,b). This would seem to call for the less demanding PCSE method which was found to perform well in 
comparable research situations and has emerged as a quasi-standard in “large N, smaller T” cross-country studies in 
comparative political economy; see Beck and Katz (1995a). We thoroughly tested both variants but the core findings  14 
independent of the FGLS/PCSE estimation methods. As part of our sensitivity checks, we also 
considered a logistic default probability – an assumption not often seen in historical research so 
far, but suggested by contemporary research on spread determinants (Eichengreen and Mody, 
1998; Kamin and Kleist, 1999).  
  In our baseline model, we regressed the annual risk premia, i.e. the interest rate 
differential between the yield of a gold (or sterling) bond of an issuer and the yield on the risk-
free British consols, in a fixed-effects framework on a vector of economic controls (X) and the 
world spread (S): 
 
Yieldi,t – YieldUK,t  =  αi + βiSt + γXi,t + ui,t  (1) 
 
To test the robustness of our analysis we also estimated a dynamic panel model. By integrating 
the lag of the dependent variable (s) this allowed us to model country risk perception as a 
Bayesian updating process. Deviations from steady state country risk can persist longer than in 
classical AR(1) models. However, because fixed effects models with lagged dependent variables 
bias OLS estimates, we opted to use a generalized methods of moment (GMM) framework. This 
allowed us to address the potential endogeneity of some regressors by using internal instruments. 







do not materially change. In order to save space, we chose to present only the PCSE estimates. In addition, neither 
the country-specific betas and rhos nor the up to 57 unit effects are shown. All additional results are available from 
the authors on request.  15 
The system GMM estimator, introduced by Arellano and Bover (1995), combines the standard 
set of equations in first differences with suitably lagged levels as instruments, with an additional 
set of equations in levels with suitably lagged first differences as instruments.
18 We examined the 
validity of the internal instruments (Hansen test) and tested for serial correlation of the error 
term. The dynamic panel regression model of the first order takes the following form: 
 
Yieldi,t – YieldUK,t = αsi,t-1 + βiSt + γXi,t + ui,t   (2) 
 
 
III. The gold standard hypothesis re-estimated 
 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we aim to reproduce the results of previous 
studies. The second step is to enlarge the sample to cover all 58 countries. Finally, we look more 
closely at sub-samples of developed and developing economies. 
 
1. Reproduction of the findings of previous studies (table II) 
As our data were collected from a number of different sources, a natural starting point is to see if 
we can replicate the findings of Bordo and Rockoff as well as Obstfeld and Taylor. Both studies 
found evidence of a significant bonus for gold standard countries of 20 to 40 basis points. 
Regressions (1–2) restrict our data to the Bordo and Rockoff and Obstfeld and Taylor samples. 
Table II demonstrates that we are able to confirm their findings. Controlling only for gold 
standard membership and correlation with market risk, our data show a spread reduction of 30 to 
40 basis points, almost identical to the benchmark figure Bordo and Rockoff arrived at earlier.  
                                                 
18 We use the “xtabond2” routine in Stata written by Roodman (2005). The one-step robust estimator is applied, 
two-step estimation yielded analogous results.  16 
  However, these regressions omit a number of important risk determinants. As discussed 
above, there are two different ways to model nineteenth-century risk perception: a modern but 
anachronistic version, and one relying only on historical data. We first took the modern path and 
denominated the debt burden, exports, the public deficit and the trade balance by GDP and 
included real GDP per capita (in logs) to control for the income level. Then we took the 
historical route, scaling the debt burden by revenues and denominating the budget deficit by total 
revenues, indicating how much more a country’s government spent than collected. We applied 
the same logic to the trade balance. To control for openness and income level, we used exports 
per capita, an indicator that contemporaries are known to have relied on (though we calculated 
exports per capita in logs).  
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Table II: reproduction of the results of previous studies 
Regression 1  2  3  4 
Sample  BR (1998)  OT (2003)  "modern"  "historical" 
R-square 0.79  0.77  0.88  0.83 
Countries 7  21  20  20 
N 218  679  577  577 
        
GS x non-default  -31.65  -44.57  -18.25  -15.51 
 2.76***  2.85***  1.69*  1.25 
Default   294.27  355.26  333.27 
   10.53***  10.55***  9.54*** 
Previous default      24.37  45.17 
     2.21**  1.75* 
Debt/GDP     32.88   
     1.23   
Exports/GDP     134.22   
     3.33***   
Deficit/GDP     -123.54   
     1.25**   
Trade balance/GDP      126.69   
     0.32   
GDP per capita (log)      -186.1   
     6.48***   
Debt/revenue       5.54 
       1.55 
Exports/population (log)      -49.33 
       3.34*** 
Budget deficit/revenues        -11.58 
       0.84 
Trade balance        50.61 
       2.43** 
International conflict      11.04  16.31 
     1.25  1.93* 
Local conflict      29.25  47.68 
     0.99  1.51 
*** statistical significance at the 1 percent, ** at the 5 percent, * at the 10 percent level. 
Note: Prais-Winsten regression with correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSE). 
Dependent variable is the spread over consols. Numbers in second line are z-values. Unit-
effects, “betas” and country-specific rhos are not reported, but available on request from the 
authors. For sources see data appendix. 
 
 
  Starting with the “modern” specification (3), the regressions again neatly reproduce the 
findings of Obstfeld and Taylor. (Our country sample was similar, but not identical, as we were  18 
able to add two more countries, Russia and Denmark.) Gold cuts off about 20 basis points in 
spreads, but is only slightly above conventional significance thresholds. Using the identical 
sample of 20 countries, we then looked at the “historical” specification as described above. This 
was to see whether or not the difference between the “modern” and “historical” approach 
actually matters. Interestingly, regressions (4) yields a similar result to the “modern” 
specification used before: gold standard membership remains worth about 15 basis points. The 
other coefficients also resemble their “modern” counterparts. We interpret this as an indication 
that the preference of historical over modern specifications may in fact be less important than has 
sometimes been suggested. Both sets of indicators seem to capture the same reality behind the 
numbers and approximate the risk perceptions of nineteenth-century investors reasonably well.  
 
2. Full sample regressions (table III) 
Regression (5) profits from the full wealth of our dataset, which (for the reasons given above) 
can be estimated only with the “historical” risk model. The estimation offers the weakest 
possible support for the “good housekeeping” hypothesis. In regression (5) gold adherence is 
worth about eight basis points, but is nowhere close to statistical significance, though it is still 
correctly signed. The estimation amply documents the importance of economic fundamentals for 
spreads. The debt-to-revenue ratio is significant, both statistically and economically. The same is 
true of exports per capita. High exporters, it seems, enjoyed much lower spreads. Defaulters, by 
contrast, were heavily punished, and previous defaulters had to pay a significant premium. The 
deficit to revenue ratio and the trade balance seem to have played a less important role. Finally, 
political instability was clearly a point of concern for investors as internal crises raised country 
risk by about half a percentage point. 
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Table III: full sample results 
Regression  5 6 7 8 9  10 
Model  Static Static Static Static  Dynamic  Dynamic 
Observations  1294  786  1294 1294 1249 1249 
Countries  58 45 58 58 58 58 
R-squared  0.84 0.86 0.84 0.83     
        
Spread  (t-1)       0.65***  0.66*** 
       5.99  5.80 
GS x non-default  -7.54  -1.91  -6.75    -8.34   
  0.78 0.15 0.66    0.53   
GS x default  -95.09  -25.51  -93.25    -148.90**   
  1.56 0.45 1.53    2.40   
GS-paper x non-default        -10.88    21.31 
       0.87  1.51 
GS-paper  x  default       -95.21  -84.01 
       1.55  0.95 
GS memory      -5.14  -4.18    -19.84 
     0.61  0.42  0.98 
Default  235.08*** 230.49*** 234.41*** 234.40*** 314.40*** 299.60*** 
  8.59 6.58 8.56 8.53 4.26 3.80 
Previous Default  82.69***  91.69***  82.16*** 82.10*** 85.60**  77.53** 
  3.92 3.87 3.91 3.89 2.32 2.19 
Debt/revenues  5.57**  5.61**  5.52**  0.83  1.694 
  2.41    2.42 2.36 0.13 0.29 
Debt  service/revenue   60.54        
    1.43      
Exports/population  (ln)  -42.86*** -64.30*** -41.96*** -41.49***  -3.72  -0.15 
  4.96 5.91 4.79 4.71 0.70 0.03 
Budget  deficit/revenues  -2.27 -17.02 -2.23 -2.216 13.34 12.96 
  0.65 1.55 0.65 0.65 1.58 1.56 
Trade  balance  -0.05 -0.14 -0.09  -0.112  1.15* 1.02* 
  0.06 0.22 0.12 0.14 1.72 1.74 
International conflict  4.29  22.04 3.99 4.026  33.93***  32.13*** 
  0.36 1.51 0.39 0.34 2.78 2.58 
Local conflict  47.64***  63.35***  48.54*** 48.71***  24.10  18.41 
  3.21 4.46 3.32 3.25 1.16 0.85 
*** statistical significance at the 1 percent, ** at the 5 percent, * at the 10 percent level. 
Note: Dependent variable is the spread over consols. Prais-Winsten regression with correlated panels 
corrected standard errors (PCSE) in static model.  Numbers in second line are z-values. Unit-effects, 
“betas” and country-specific rhos are not reported, but available on request from the authors. Robust one-
step Arellano-Bond system GMM dynamic panel estimation in dynamic specification. Robust z-values are 
given in second row. For the system GMM estimation we treated the debt ratio, the budget balance and 
default as weakly exogenous, and all other variables are weakly exogenous. We use the entire lag 
structure for instrumentation, i.e. starting from the (t-2) lag of the difference for the levels equation, and 
the (t-1) lag of the level for the difference equations. Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences. For 
sources see data appendix.  20 
 
 
Regression (6) employs a different denominator for the debt burden, namely the debt service-to-
revenue ratio, as advocated by Flandreau and Zumer (2004). But this modification does not yield 
a meaningfully different result from the debt-to-revenue ratio, which we preferred as the most 
frequently cited indicator in financial publications of the time and less affected by endogeneity 
than the debt service ratio. Do differences in the coding of gold standard countries affect the 
results? We tested this by using the “de facto” gold coding from Flandreau and Zumer and the 
classification from Meissner. But the results hardly changed. The gold standard dummy remains 
correctly signed, but statistically insignificant.
19  
  The following regressions look at two potentially important omissions in the previous 
literature. First, regression (7) adds a “probation dummy”, to see whether the market rewarded 
god standard adherence only after a period of faithful compliance with the rules. The result is 
unconvincing, both statistically and economically: Even after five years of rule-bound monetary 
policy, the credibility effects as measured by country risk spreads were tiny and statistically not 
robust. Regression (8) focuses on countries that joined the gold standard from a paper standard 
and excludes those that simply “switched” from silver or bimetallism to gold. The idea is that the 
credibility effects associated with a “hard peg” might already have been reaped with the adoption 
of silver convertibility (Mexico and India being the most prominent examples) so that the gold 
effect might be more obvious in countries that made the transition directly from paper to gold. 
However, the results documented in table III do not support this idea. We find a statistically 
insignificant 10 basis points reduction in country risk for economies that adopted gold coming 
from a paper standard.  
                                                 
19 They detailed results are available from the authors on request.  21 
  Regressions (9) and (10) present a different model, namely a dynamic panel model which 
includes the lagged dependent variable as a regressor and hence models country risk perception 
as a Bayesian updating process. By using internal instruments, we were also able to control for 
the potential endogeneity of some of the regressors such as the debt ratio. Despite the different 
estimation strategy the results are consistent with our previous results. According to the GMM 
estimation (9), gold standard adherence has a slight positive effect of around eight basis points, 
but again fails to pass standard significance tests. In the case of countries that made the transition 
directly from paper to gold (10), the effect becomes slightly negative, adding more doubts to the 
robustness of the “good housekeeping” argument.   
In sum, while we were able to reproduce earlier findings of a gold effect using previous 
smaller samples, the gold effect tended to become less visible in our much larger country sample. 
Though still correctly signed, the gold dummy was no longer significant, even when we varied 
the gold coding criteria or looked only at countries that made the paper-gold transition. As this 
seems to underline the importance of sample selection, the logical next step was to look more 
closely at sub-samples.  
 
3. Individual sub-samples (table IV) 
An important feature of our full sample may be the presence of twenty-three British colonies. 
Colonial bonds were treated as a different asset both on account of their lower spreads and their 
much lower correlation with market risk (Ferguson and Schularick, 2006). Some colonies were 
effectively in a currency union with the United Kingdom. Moreover, colonies tended to have 
above-average trade openness, as well as British-style fiscal and legal institutions.  
  As a first step, we used a Chow-test to find out, whether there were significant structural 
differences, i.e. unequal coefficients, between independent countries and British colonies. The 
resulting F-statistic is far above the critical value, so that we reject the idea that both groups had 
equal coefficients. Regression (11) confirms that colonies were treated differently from  22 
independent borrowers when they entered the capital market. Debt and income levels did not 
matter for risk premia, while exports per capita have the wrong sign, implying that poorer 
colonies paid lower interest. The gold dummy is statistically and economically insignificant. In 




[TABLE IV about here] 
                                                 
20 Most colonies in Asia and Africa switched to a gold-exchange standard shortly before or after 1900. The case of 
India is a well-known example. Yet some colonies like Hong Kong remained on silver throughout.  23 
 
Table IV: subsample results 














Model Static  Static  Static  Static  Dynamic  Dynamic 
Observations  514  780 366 414 749 395 
Countries 23  36  13  22  35  22 
R-squared 0.71  0.84  0.82  0.86     
            
Spread (t-1)          0.62***  0.58*** 
         6.03  4.98 
GS x non-default  -5.05  -2.29 -50.31*** 9.44  -4.25  11.51 
 0.42  0.18  3.21  0.54  0.19  0.44 
GS x default    -95.87    -120.18*  -143.40**  120.10** 
   1.55    1.88  2.39  2.01 
Default   225.27***  247.56***  234.97***  309.70***  291.90*** 
   8.19  4.16  7.58  4.07  3.50 
Previous  Default    76.51*** 100.02** 81.29***  86.41**  89.89*** 
   3.59  2.16  3.53  2.51  2.68 
Debt/revenues 1.21  5.41*  4.67  10.17***  -1.78  5.69 
 1.25  1.74  0.92  2.64  0.24  1.01 
Exports/population (ln)  4.17  -88.85***  -54.67***  -132.65***  -9.95  -5.07 
 0.63  6.21  2.91  6.16  1.09  0.28 
Budget deficit/revenues  8.48***  -2.76  1.06  -3.05  12.08  6.08 
 2.98  0.75  0.12  0.81  1.32  0.96 
Trade balance  -1.98***  45.31**  49.17*  62.34**  23.49  48.74 
 3.36  2.38  1.94  2.48  1.14  1.31 
International conflict    0.27  2.14  1.92  21.41**  29.22** 
   0.02  0.28  0.12  2.05  2.07 
Local conflict    43.66***  38.25  45.91***  20.26  13.48 
   3.07  0.68  3.17  1.02  0.64 
AB-test (p-value)          0.55  0.59 
Sargan test (p-value)          0.44  0.57 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent, ** at the 5 percent, * at the 10 percent level. 
Note: Dependent variable is the spread over consols. Prais-Winsten regression with correlated panels 
corrected standard errors (PCSE) in static model.  Numbers in second line are z-values. Unit-effects, 
“betas” and country-specific rhos are not reported, but available on request from the authors. Robust one-
step Arellano-Bond system GMM dynamic panel estimation in dynamic specification. Robust z-values are 
given in second row. For the system GMM estimation we treated the debt ratio, the budget balance and 
default as weakly exogenous, and all other variables are weakly exogenous. We use the entire lag 
structure for instrumentation, i.e. starting from the (t-2) lag of the difference for the levels equation, and 
the (t-1) lag of the level for the difference equations. Arellano-Bond (AB) test for AR(2) in first differences. 
Sources see data appendix. 
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What happened when we looked only at the determinants of bond spreads of independent 
borrowers? In contrast to colonies, fundamentals re-appear as important drivers of risk 
perception in regression (12). The effect of debt and income level on risk premia is particularly 
large, while the value of gold is very small and again – by a substantial margin – statistically 
insignificant. The question hence remains why the gold effect is much weaker in our sample 
compared to previous smaller samples. A brief look at the list of countries we added – such as 
Turkey, China, Persia, Siam, the Balkan states, and, besides Mexico, a number of smaller Latin 
American countries – suggests that the gold effect may lose significance as the number of 
capital-poor independent countries grows relative to more advanced “Atlantic” economies.  
  
4. Developed vs. less-developed economies (table V) 
Were poor countries different in that gold adherence did not bring any tangible credibility gains 
in the eyes of international capital markets? We performed another Chow-test, splitting the 
sample into a poor country sample and a rich country sample to see if there are structural 
differences between the two. Countries with a GDP per capita of less than one third of the UK 
were classified as poor developing countries.
21 Again, a Chow-test led us to reject the 
assumption that both groups have equal coefficients.  
We were now left with two groups, consisting of 16 relatively developed independent 
countries (DCs), mainly belonging to the “Atlantic” economy, and a group of 22 independent, 
but less developed countries (LDCs) from Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. Running a 
separate regression for the 16 developed countries in the sample, we found a surprising result. 
For the developed (non-colonial) economies, the gold standard hypothesis seemed to hold: 
                                                 
21 The GDP per capita threshold is 1,500 US-dollars (1990 prices, PPP) in 1900 according to Maddison (1995) 
which is roughly equivalent to one third of British GDP per capita at the time. The regressions yielded the same 
result when we split the sample at 2,000 and 1,000 dollars, and also a geographic split (all countries outside Western 
Europe and North America being classified as developing countries) led to identical conclusions about the 
indifference of the market to monetary commitments in poor countries.  25 
joining the gold club brought a statistically highly significant reduction of risk premia of up to 50 
basis points, just as the early study by Bordo and Rockoff had found. Yet a separate regression 
for the 22 less developed countries yielded an equally clear result: Adoption of the gold standard 
did not bring credibility gains. The gold variable was incorrectly signed and insignificant in any 
specification, whether we used a static (14) or dynamic specification (15), CAPM-betas or time-
dummies, de iure or de facto coding. The market, we infer, did not confer a “good housekeeping 
seal of approval” on poor peripheral countries merely because they adopted the gold standard. 
Many peripheral countries tried but few, if any, reaped the benefit of enhanced credibility 
supposedly associated with gold standard membership. 
  This, then, explains why previous studies could not agree on the importance of the gold 
effect. In those studies where country risk perception was modeled on the basis of GDP 
reconstructions, the data availability led to the selection of a relatively wealthy country sample.
22 
But the gold standard hypothesis vanishes if the whole population of foreign borrowers in 
London is taken into account. The market, it seems, did not reward gold adherence in poor 
countries and rich countries equally. Credibility gains associated with gold convertibility were 
limited to countries above a certain state of economic development.  
  Given the potential implications of this finding for the hypothesis of gold as a credible 
commitment mechanism and potential policy implications for developing countries, we finally 
looked more closely at the determinants of risk pricing in the poor periphery, including some 
potential risk factors that had not been considered before. In particular, we focused on countries 
that transitioned directly from paper to gold. Regression (17) includes all poor economies, 
sovereign states and colonies, while regression (18) restricts the sample to independent 
developing economies. It can be seen from table V that, in both cases, gold standard adherence 
had no effect on country risk. There is virtually a zero-impact in the first regression, and in the 
                                                 
22 Our results in table 2 above show that the different modelling of risk pricing (modern vs. historical) does not drive 
the results.   26 
second gold adherence even takes the “wrong” sign. Regression (19) adds the share of primary 
products in exports, the average tariff rate and the terms of trade. The key finding remains 
unchanged: gold adoption did not lead to credibility gains for poor countries. We obtained the 
same result when we took the dependent variable in logs (19).    
  Last but not least, we again moved beyond previous models by specifying dynamics 
models for all LDCs (including poor colonies) and independent LDCs. Both dynamic models 
confirm the results obtained before (18), namely that the gold standard coefficient is not only 
insignificant, but also takes on a positive sign. In sum, rule-bound monetary policy as implied by 
gold standard adherence did not convey tangible credibility benefits on poor countries. 
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Table V: policy credibility in the periphery 
Regression 17  18  19  20  21  22 









all LDC's  non-
colonial 
LDC's 
Model Static  Static  Static  Static  Dynamic  Dynamic 
Observations  745 412 300  300  706 386 
Countries 36  22  13  13  36  22 
R-squared 0.84  0.86  0.87  0.99     
          
Spread (t-1)          0.58***  0.57*** 
         5.00  4.88 
GS-paper x non-default  -0.62 17.26 19.91  0.052  18.08 32.41 
 0.03  0.84  0.80  0.72  1.37  1.47 
GS-paper x default  -103.60*  -117.60*      -105.6  -108.4 
 (.65  1.82      1.60  1.54 
GS memory  -6.00  -4.53      -29.99  -30.51 
 0.53  0.22      1.30  1.03 
Default  241.10*** 235.50*** 329.20*** 0.63*** 299.10*** 289.10*** 
 7.68  7.67  10.10  8.54  4.08  3.47 
Previous default  83.95***  80.75***  114.20***  0.15**  92.29**  87.23*** 
 3.67  3.53  4.91  2.50  2.48  2.59 
Debt/revenues# 8.81***  10.32***  18.58***  0.05***  1.63  5.97 
 2.72  2.71  4.66  4.93  0.25  1.00 
Exports/population (ln)  -49.83***  -133.0***  -123.4***  -0.44***  -2.29  -4.73 
 4.49  6.07  4.88  6.74  0.38  0.27 
Budget deficit/revenues#  -2.24  -3.01 0.11  -0.01  10.35 6.26 
 0.61  0.77  0.02  1.18  1.44  0.98 
Trade balance#  -0.14  62.68**  -20.10 0.21***  1.17*  46.94 
 0.15  2.47  0.78  3.22  1.78  1.22 
Primary  exports     -538.00  -0.40    
     1.11  0.39    
Tariff  level     -0.25  -0.002    
     0.22  0.90    
Terms of Trade (percent change)#      0.39  -0.0009     
     1.14  1.22    
International conflict  3.25  1.93  15.37  0.09**  34.24**  27.57** 
 0.22  0.12  1.07  1.96  2.39  2.06 
Local conflict  50.11***  46.33***  61.07***  0.09*  29.09  22.37 
 3.23  3.03  2.99  1.88  1.46  1.22 
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)          0.21  0.64 
Sargan test (p-value)          0.62  0.54 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent, ** at the 5 percent, * at the 10 percent level. 
Note: Dependent variable is the spread over consols. Prais-Winsten regression with correlated panels 
corrected standard errors (PCSE) in static model. Numbers in second line are z-values. Unit-effects, 
“betas” and country-specific rhos are not reported, but available on request from the authors. Variables 
market # are lagged by one year in (16). Dependent variable in (17) is the logarithm of the spread over 
consols. Robust one-step Arellano-Bond system GMM dynamic panel estimation in dynamic specification. 
Robust z-values are given in second row. For the system GMM estimation we treated the debt ratio, the 
budget balance and default as weakly exogenous, and all other variables are weakly exogenous. We use 
the entire lag structure for instrumentation, i.e. starting from the (t-2) lag of the difference for the levels 
equation, and the (t-1) lag of the level for the difference equations. Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences. Sources see data appendix. 
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IV. Policy credibility in the poor periphery 
 
Whatever its significance for relatively rich independent countries, gold adoption made little, if 
any, difference to the perceived country risk of two important sub-groups within our global 
sample: British colonies and poor independent countries. It is questionable whether the positive 
effects that are evident for the top third of countries on the pre-1913 income ladder should 
therefore be interpreted as evidence of a rule of the sort proposed by Bordo et al., or as 
exceptions to a more general rule that monetary regime-changes by themselves do little to 
enhance credibility. Below a certain income threshold, policy credibility remained by and large 
unaffected by changes in the monetary regime. For a poor country seeking to borrow in London 
at sustainable rates, we are tempted to suggest, it made more sense to become a British colony 
than to join the gold standard. 
Why did bond market investors reward gold standard adherence in more developed 
countries, but disbelieve promises of “good housekeeping” in less developed countries? We 
propose two explanations that are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Both focus on 
characteristics of developing countries that reduce the probability that a commitment to a 
currency peg will have a durable disciplining effect on policy-making. First, as Drazen and 
Masson (1994, 736) have pointed out, the credibility of policies and the credibility of policy-
making are two different things. The market is unlikely to find the promise of “tough” policies 
equally credible in all circumstances. Like Drazen and Masson, we are uncomfortable with the 
dogma that “tying one’s hands” is automatically rewarded by the market, because it implies – 
wrongly in our view – that investors do not think about the likely sustainability of the “promise 
of self-restraint”, which is highly contingent on a country’s economic and political situation and 
prospects. Even if economic policy-makers before 1914 were more insulated from popular  29 
political pressures than would be the case after 1918, other factors remained that affected the 
probability of their sticking to their gold-standard commitments in the face of adverse 
conditions. Poor countries, because of their backward economic structures, were more exposed 
than most rich countries to shocks – to the vagaries of world agricultural markets, sudden 
changes in terms of trade and growth trajectories. Agrarian lobbies, with their fondness for 
currency devaluations and low interest rates, were even more powerful in poor countries than in 
rich precisely because the interest-groups supportive of gold commitments (notably bankers and 
bourgeois rentiers) were much smaller and weaker. A rational investor had good reasons to 
believe that Sweden would be less likely to suspend convertibility than Siam or Venezuela.    
Table V compares a number of plausible factors that contributed to the market’s 
assessment of the “promise of self-restraint”. It shows that the more advanced countries, on 
which gold adherence seems to have conferred a credibility bonus, were also special in other 
respects: they were twice as open, they traded about twice as much with other gold standard 
countries, their exports were less dominated by primary products and they were better integrated 
into world markets as measured by their considerably smaller shipping distances from London. 
Their income levels, in other words, can be seen as a proxy for a number of other characteristics 
that were likely to bolster market confidence in their long-run commitments to gold. For the 
great majority of developing countries, however, the gold commitment was a rule that could be 
overthrown at relatively low cost and one that was therefore quite likely to be challenged in a 
crisis. It would be surprising if it had been very credible.  
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GDP per capita (USD 1990)  1122 2580
Average GDP growth, percent p.a.  2.29 3.66
Trade with gold standard countries/total 
trade 
0.83 0.91
Terms of trade*  11 8
Exports/GDP 0.11 0.24
Primary product exports/exports  0.92 0.81
Average tariff level (percent)  24 15
Effective distance from London**  2.89 2.01
Years of internal or external conflict  3.88 0.61
* Standard deviation of annual percentage changes. ** Shipping distance adjusted for 
transports cost (pre-Panama canal). 
Note: Group of advanced countries excludes the UK, France, Germany, and the US. 
Classification of countries according to GDP per capita level in 1900. See text and data 
appendix. 
Sources: see data appendix.       
 
 
Our second explanation is purely political. In the eyes of the market, the credibility gains 
through gold standard adoption may have been low in poor countries simply because political 
instability was high. In other words, where the political and social fabric of a country is still 
crisis-prone, its monetary regime is likely to be a second-order concern for the market. As 
political conflict is typically more heated, the rules of the political game are rewritten much more 
often in poor countries than in developed ones. Yet if constitutions change frequently, investors 
have good reason not to put too much faith in the durability of one particular law that requires 
monetary policy to follow a strict rule. Investors in Colombian, Greek, or Persian bonds were 
most of the time concerned with permanent threats to internal or external security that could have 
ruined the credit of the country. Monetary clauses mattered much less in such cases. That would 
seem to be confirmed by the fact that the contemporary British press dwelt extensively on the  31 
political developments in these countries, but rarely (if ever) referred to convertibility 
arrangements. We cannot help feeling that, if the City had been as interested in currency clauses 
as some have claimed, financial journalists would have written a good deal more about them.  
Our results suggest that the potential time-inconsistency of monetary policy was not the 
dominant concern of investors in developing countries before 1914. Their vulnerability to 
economic and political shocks was far more important. The same may apply today, in the most 
recent era of globalization. Feuerstein and Grimm (2006) have shown in a recent article that a 
hard exchange rate peg is not the optimal monetary solution if vulnerability to shocks, not time-
inconsistency, is the dominant problem. As policy can react to shocks only after a delay, even the 
threat of a shock can make the abandonment of the peg more likely ex ante. In a similar vein, 
Guidotto and Veigh (1999) have argued that the credibility of hard pegs falls quickly after an 
initial stabilization period as the underlying economic weaknesses come to the fore again. 
Although theoretically appealing at first glance, our empirical results show that pre-committing 
policy to a binding rule was also not a good remedy for the economic ills developing countries 
faced in the first era of globalization. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The hypothesis that gold standard membership conferred a “good housekeeping seal of 
approval” on international borrowers before 1914 is not wholly without empirical foundation. 
There clearly was some kind of benefit in the form of reduced risk premia – but only for certain 
countries that went onto gold. Yet even this limited vindication of the “good housekeeping” 
hypothesis requires qualification. In those relatively advanced countries for which the hypothesis 
seems to hold, the gold dummy may merely be a proxy for fundamental improvements not 
properly reflected by other covariates; or it may merely capture the effect of relatively low 
transaction costs. Unilateral promises of exchange rate stability and of complementary economic 
policies may have provided additional credibility, but only in special circumstances.  32 
By applying the full range of available empirical techniques to our expanded sample of 
sovereign and colonial borrowers, we have shown that there were no benefits of going on gold 
for the majority of less developed economies before the First World War. If the international 
gold standard performed any service for such countries, it was by minimizing inflation 
expectations in rich countries, and thus contributing to the low and stable long-term interest rates 
in the core that were so crucial for encouraging capital flows to the periphery. In the last era of 
globalization, as today, investors priced country risk on the basis of a complex mixture of 
economic fundamentals and political factors such as colonial status. In this sense, it may make 
more sense to think of the gold standard less as a “seal of approval” and more as a kind of “thin 
film”, behind which investors were wise to look. The key historical lesson from the “natural 
experiment” of the gold standard era is that in the poor periphery – where policy credibility is a 
particularly acute problem – rule-bound monetary policy did not result in credibility gains. In 
volatile economic and political environments, monetary policy commitments are no short-cut to 
credibility. Vulnerability to economic and political shocks, not time-inconsistency, were and 
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